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The study employs Girton and Roper (1977) measure of exchange market 
pressure—sum of exchange rate depreciation and foreign reserves outflow, to 
examine the interaction between exchange market pressure and monetary 
variables, viz. domestic credit (Reserve Money) and interest rate. Evidence from 
impulse response functions suggests that domestic credit has remained the 
dominant tool of monetary policy for managing exchange market pressure. The 
increase in domestic credit upon increase in exchange market pressure (during 
1991–98) is imprudent. The result suggests that fiscal needs/growth objective 
might have dominated the external account considerations during the span. Post 
9/11 there is evidence of sterilised intervention in forex market. Interest rate has 
also weakly served as the tool of monetary policy during the hay days of foreign 
currency deposits (1991–98). The finding implies that for interest rate to work as 
tool of monetary policy vis-a-vis exchange market pressure a reasonable degree 
of capital mobility is called for. 
 
JEL classification:  E 52, F 31 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
Exchange market pressure (emp) generally refers to disequilibrium in 
money market. Knowledge of mechanism and instruments that help achieve the 
money market equilibrium has important policy implications. Monetary 
approach to balance of payments and monetary approach to exchange rate 
respectively hold that under fixed exchange rate regime the money market 
equilibrium is achieved through changes in foreign reserves while in case of 
pure float the exchange rate bears the adjustment burden.
1  
Under managed float exchange rate regime, changes in exchange rate and 
variation in foreign reserves are the two sides of the same coin—hide one and 
the other shows up. For example post 9/11 the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) 
actively intervened in the forex market—first to smoothen the appreciation of 
exchange rate by purchasing foreign currency from the forex market thereby 
building up foreign reserves and then since November 2004 SBP has been 
providing foreign currency from reserves for oil imports, to avoid depreciation 
of exchange rate. Therefore under managed float, to examine the disequlibrium 
in money market, we need a composite variable that incorporates changes in 
exchange rate as well as variation in foreign reserves.  Girton and Roper (1977) 
construct the requisite composite variable as ‘simple sum of exchange rate 
depreciation and variation in foreign reserves scaled by monetary base’ and call 
it exchange market pressure (emp). 
This study uses the composite variable emp rather than foreign reserves or 
exchange rate, to study the interaction between monetary variables and external 
account. Specifically the study examines the nature of influence of monetary 
variables viz. domestic credit and interest rate upon exchange market pressure 
and vice versa. The analysis is likely to facilitate monetary management. The 
study will also reveal whether the instrument of domestic credit or interest rate 
has been used by the authorities to manage exchange market pressure. The use 
of domestic credit implies quantitative monetary management i.e. directly 
varying the level of money supply whereas the use of interest rate implies 
market-based monetary management. The two monetary regimes carry different 
implications for the economy.  
                                                 
Acknowledgements: The author is grateful to the participants of the Pakistan Institute of 
Development Economics (PIDE) Nurturing Minds seminar series for valuable suggestion and 
comments on an earlier draft of the paper. All errors and omissions remain the sole responsibility of 
the author.  
1To understand the mechanism, for different exchange rate regimes, that help achieve the 
equilibrium under monetary approach [see Frenkel (1976), Mussa (1976) and Pilbeam (1999)].   2 
The study is organised as follows: Section 2 is devoted to review of 
literature on emp model, Section 3 develops the theoretical and empirical 
framework for the study, Section 4 concerns data issues, Section 5 reports and 
analyses the results from econometric investigation and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Seminal work on exchange market pressure, as a composite variable is of 
Girton and Roper (1977). They developed a model to explain both the exchange 
rate movement and variation in foreign reserves and referred to the composite 
variable (r + e ) as exchange market pressure, where r represents the change in 
foreign reserves scaled by monetary base (reserve money) and e reflects the 
percentage change in exchange rate over the period under consideration. 
 
2.1.  Girton and Roper’s emp Model 
The main theoretical proposition of the Girton and Roper (henceforth 
GR) model is that the domestic money market equilibrium if disturbed is 
restored through some combination of the currency depreciation/appreciation 
and foreign reserves outflow/inflow. The excess domestic money supply will 
cause a combination of currency depreciation and reserves outflow while excess 
domestic money demand will cause some combination of currency appreciation 
and reserves inflow to restore the money market equilibrium.  
GR’s model organises the analysis around demand and supply of national 
monies. According to their formulation emp is a function of growth in domestic 
credit, growth in foreign money supply and the differential between growth of 
domestic and foreign real income. The assumptions, explicit and implicit, in GR 
model are: Stable demand for money function (money multiplier is held 
constant), purchasing power parity holds, flow equilibrium in money market and 
domestic and foreign, interest rates are assumed to grow at equal rate, that is, 
interest rate differential is held constant. 
GR’s model differs from other monetary models of Balance of Payments 
(BOP) in three respects. First, the dependent variable is exchange market 
pressure, defined as the sum r + e, rather than the BOP per se, second the model 
takes the view that a country’s monetary policy can be judged as tight or loose 
only by reference to monetary policy, generally, being practiced in rest of the 
world. Third GR’s model holds for all exchange rate regimes (of the dependent 
variable r +e, r and e are respectively zero, under floating and fixed exchange 
regimes, rest of the model remains unchanged). 
The GR model has been applied extensively, with certain modifications. 
The applications include Cannolly and Silveira (1979) to Brazil, Paradhan, et al. 
(1989), to India, Modeste (1981) to Argentina, Kim (1985) to Korea and Wohar 
and Lee (1992) to Japan, Thornton (1995), Tanner (2001) for six East Asian   3 
countries, Kamaly and Erbil (2000) for three MENA region countries, Tanner 
(2002) for 32 countries and Bautista and Bautista (2005) for Philippines. 
The recent emp models by assuming a small open economy obviates from 
monetary dependence apparent in GR’s model. The earlier models held that 
foreign disturbances are transmitted to the home country through growth in 
foreign money supply however the recent models rely upon interest rate 
differential and inflation differential to carry-over the foreign disturbances to the 
domestic economy. The recent models have also relaxed the assumption that 
purchasing power parity holds. Another improvement affected, at empirical 
stage, in recent studies, is that these, by using VAR, take care of the endogeneity 
in the emp model that earlier studies failed to tackle. Till Thornton (1995) the 
emp model was primarily used only to validate the monetary approach however 
recent studies tend to examine whether the tool of monetary policy, viz-á-viz 
exchange market pressure, has been domestic credit or interest rate. 
All the studies listed above validate the monetary approach. Most of the 
studies referred above have tested the efficacy of emp model by using foreign 
reserves as the sole dependent variable rather than the composite variable emp. 
Except for Wohar and Lee (for Japan) and Paradhan, et al. (for India) others find that 
the fit deteriorates significantly when foreign reserves (r) is used as the sole 
dependent variable. This proves the efficacy of the emp model. Tanner (2001, 2002) 
and Bautista and Bautista (2005) find that the feedback relation from exchange 
market pressure to domestic credit is positive. The authors take this to be a sign of 
sterilisation of reserves outflow. Kamaly and Erbil (2000), Tanner (2001, 2002) find 
that domestic credit has been the dominant tool for managing exchange market 
pressure in the countries examined. Bautista and Bautista (2005) which examines 
emp in Philippines, covers Asian currency crises period as well. They find that 
during the crises period exchange market pressure increases with increase in interest 
rate differential. The finding is against conventional wisdom. The authors infer from 
this that in times of currency crisis interest rate cannot be relied upon as a tool of 
monetary management vis-à-vis exchange market pressure. 
 
3.  THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1.  The Model 
We use a model similar to the one used by Kamaly and Erbil (2000) and 
Tanner (2001, 2002). The model is:   
t t t t t t z i y dc emp + π − α + β − =
•
*   … … … …  (3.1) 
Where: 
: t emp  Exchange Market Pressure at time t, 
    t dc : Growth in domestic credit (scaled by monetary base)     4 
      t y : Growth in real income   
       t i : Growth in nominal interest rate  
   
*
t π : Growth in international inflation  
      t z : Deviation from PPP rate  
The system given by Equation (3.1) has endogeneity—not only the 
domestic credit and interest rate influence exchange market pressure (emp) but 
emp also influences the two variables.
2  Given endogeneity in Equation (3.1), we 
use VAR framework to estimate Equation 3.1.
3 The VAR framework for 
Equation 3.1 can be written as: 
t t t j t j
P
J





0   … … …  (3.2) 
Where  t t t t t i y emp dc q , , , = ,  Aj  is vector of coefficients of the endogenous 
variables, δ and λ represent the coefficients of the two exogenous variables: t z  
and 
*
t π  and t e =
t dc e ,  
t i e
t y e
t emp e is a vector of innovation. Each element 
of the innovation vector  t e is in turn composed of own error terms wt and 
contemporaneous correlation, based on assumed Ordering, with other 
innovation ( s i' β ).  
 
3.2.  Identification of IRF’s: Choleski Decomposition 
An unrestricted VAR system as given by Equation (3.2) is under 
identified. To identify the impulse response functions (IRF’s) Choleski 
decomposition is used to impose restrictions on the four variables VAR. 
Ordering of the variables assumed for the purpose is: [dct  it  yt  empt]. Sensitivity 
of the results to following alternate orderings will be tested. 
(1)  [dct   it  empt  yt]  
(2)  [dct  empt  it  yt]              
(3)  [empt  dct   it  yt]  
 
3.2.1.  Economic Rationale for the Assumed Ordering  
Domestic credit being a policy variable influences all other variables 
contemporaneously but is itself influenced by own contemporaneous innovation 
                                                 
2For detailed reasoning in this regard [see Kamaly and Erbil (2000)]. 
3To ascertain the suitability of VAR framework for estimation of a system like Equation 
(3.1) [see Tanner (2001, 2002) and Kamaly and Erbil (2000) and Gujarati (1998)]. For technical 
aspects of VAR framework [see Enders (1995)].   5 
only. Interest rate despite being a policy variable is partly determined in market 
therefore its exogeneity ranking is lower than domestic credit. Real income is 
known to be influenced by monetary variables therefore its exogeneity ranking 
is lower than the two monetary variables. Monetary variables as well as real 
variables do influence the level of exchange rate and foreign reserves. Hence the 
lowest exogeneity ranking of exchange market pressure. 
  
3.3.  Hypotheses 
Our hypotheses of interest are extracted from Equation (3.2). These are: 
•  0 . > β
t t t dc dc emp w and, 
•  0 . > β
t t t emp i emp w  
The first one implies that shock to innovation to domestic credit has a 
positive impact upon exchange market pressure while the second one posits that 
impact of shock to innovation to interest rate upon exchange market pressure is 
positive. The discussion on theoretical foundations of the hypotheses follows. 
 
3.3.1.  Domestic Credit: Positive Relationship with emp 
Positive influence of shock to innovation to domestic credit upon 
exchange market pressure stems from monetary approach: According to 
monetary approach to BOP, payment imbalances reflect disequilibrium in 
money market. The approach posits that BOP deficit and BOP surplus 
respectively corrects for the excess supply of money and excess demand for 
money. In case of free float the adjustment burden falls on the exchange rate 
while under managed float the foreign reserves and the exchange rate together 
(i.e. emp) shoulder the adjustment burden. The monetary authority, in its own 
discretion determines the adjustment proportion.  
Given the foregoing, an increase in domestic credit is offset by exchange 
rate depreciation or foreign reserves outflow or some combination of the two, 
that is, increase in exchange market pressure. Hence the positive impact of 
change in domestic credit upon exchange market pressure. 
 
3.3.2.  Interest Rate: Positive Relationship with emp 
The theoretical foundation for the relationship between shock to 
innovation to interest rate and exchange market pressure is drawn from the 
theory of money demand and interest rate parity theory. 
According to Keynesian theory of money demand interest rate bears negative 
relationship with money demand. The following flow chart shows the channel 
through which interest rate exercises influence upon exchange market pressure. 
Increase in interest rate → decrease in real money demand (leading to 
excess supply) → Foreign reserves outflow/exchange rate depreciation → 
increase in exchange market pressure.   6 
The relationship between interest rate and exchange market pressure can 
also be traced to interest rate parity theory. Popularised as uncovered interest 
parity (UIP) condition, essence of the theory is that, the expected rate of 
depreciation of domestic currency is equal to the interest rate differential 
between domestic and foreign interest rates. In other words given foreign 
interest rate, an increase in domestic interest rate will lead to depreciation of 
domestic currency, implying an increase in exchange market pressure. Hence the 
positive influence of interest rate upon exchange market pressure as reflected in 
our exchange market pressure model given by Equation (3.2). 
  
4. THE DATA 
 
4.1.  Data Span 
Data span of the study is: 1991:04-2005:12. Given that exchange 
market pressure model is particularly applicable to managed float (though it is 
possible to use the model for other exchange rate regimes as well), therefore 
one logical starting point of the data span is January 08, 1982—the day 
Pakistan adopted managed float. However we use 1991 as the starting point 
because of the following. Prior to March 1991 interest rate was regulated by 
SBP, interest rate on Government Treasury Depository Receipts (GTDRs), 
whose features are similar to that of Treasury Bills now in vogue, was changed 
only  once during the eight years preceding March 1991. This is enough to 
conclude that interest rate was not being used as an instrument of monetary 
policy prior to 1991. Our objective being to determine whether the dominant 
tool of monetary policy vis-à-vis exchange market pressure is ‘interest rate’ or 
‘domestic credit’, we cannot include data prior to March 1991. Hence the 
small sample of 14.9 years that we have. Besides we use three sub-spans 
spanning over 7.2, 7.7 and 4.4 years. The characteristics of these sub-spans are 
indicated in Table 4.1 below. 
                                                               
Table 4.1 
Data Span: Characteristics 
From To  Peculiarity 
Length 
(Years) 
1991:04  2005:12  Initiation of the move towards market based 
monetary policy (Full span)  14.9 
1991:04  1998:05  Life period of Foreign Currency Deposits 
(FCDs) 7.2 
1998:06 2005:12 Post-FCDs freeze / 9/11 
7.7 
2001:09 2005:12 Post  9/11  4.4   7 
The motivation for the full span of 14.9 years has been discussed above. 
The motivation for the sub spans follows: 
 
4.1.1.  Sub-Spans: 1991:04-1998:05 and 1998:06-05 
Foreign Currency Deposit Accounts (FCDs) during their short active life 
had been not only a key source of foreign currency for the authorities but had 
led to dollarisation as well. Both in turn influenced exchange market pressure 
and the monetary policy. The developments call for analysis of the relationship 
that prevailed between the exchange market pressure and the monetary 
variables. Secondly in May 1998, as Pakistan went Nuclear, foreign aid 
sanctions were imposed on Pakistan. The post-freeze/post-sanctions span will 
allow us to examine as to how the authorities managed the pressure in the crises 
period. 
 
4.1.2.  Sub-Span: 2001:10-2005:12 
Certain events triggered by 9/11 led to dramatic reduction in exchange 
market pressure. It is important to see how the monetary policy reacted to the 
change in the direction of exchange market pressure. Hence we use the data-
span 2001:09-2005:12. 
 
4.2.  Frequency 
Data frequency is monthly. The motivation for using high frequency data 
is that the data among others, includes, domestic credit, interest rate, exchange 
rate and foreign reserves. These variables have dynamic properties that can be 
best captured with high frequency data. Besides, as mentioned above, we have a 
relatively small sample of 14.9 years. Given the small sample size, the use of 
annual data is ruled out for reliable econometric investigation. Similarly, the 
smaller sub-spans, referred above, rule out the use of even quarterly data. 
 
4.3.  Variables 
The variables included in the empirical model given by Equation (3.2) 
are: Exchange Market Pressure (empt), Domestic Credit (dct), Interest rate [Six 
month T-bill rate: (it)], Real income [Proxy: Industrial production (yt)]
4, 
International inflation [Proxy: U.S. inflation (π*t)] and Deviation from 
purchasing power parity (zt).  
Of the six variables mentioned above, data for the series’ it, yt and π*t are 
directly available in published statistics while data for the series dct, empt and zt 
is to be generated. This in turn requires data on some more variables. (The 
                                                 
4Monthly data on real income is not available. The use of industrial production as proxy for 
real income is well established.   8 
generation of the series’ is discussed in Annexure A).  In all we require data on: 
nominal exchange rate, foreign reserves, Industrial production index, domestic 
credit, interest rate and CPI (US and Pakistan). The data has been obtained from 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD-ROM (May 2006).  
 
4.4.  Stationarity 
All the data series have been tested for absence of unit root. The tests 
employed include Dickey Fuller/ Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and the 
seasonal unit root test proposed by Baeulieu and Miron (1993). We employ the 
seasonal root test because the monthly data is more prone to seasonality. The 
ADF test as well as the seasonal unit root test shows that all the series exhibit 
stationarity. The result is not surprising as the model employs all variables in 
growth form. 
 
5. VAR ESTIMATION OF EMP MODEL 
VAR estimation involves regressing each one of the endogenous 
variables on its own lags. To estimate the VAR system we must decide the lag 
order of the endogenous variables to be incorporated in the VAR system. 
Besides, following the standard AIC method for selection of the lag order, we 
additionally ensure that residuals of the regressions that form part of the VAR 
system do not exhibit serial correlation. Use of the foregoing process delivers 
the lags mentioned against each data span in Table 5.1. These lags are in 
conformity with AIC method as well.  
 
Table 5.1 









Full span  1991:04-2005:12  14.9  4 
Post-liberalisation 1995-2005  11  3 
FCD Span  1991-04-1998-05  7.2  2 
Post FCD Freeze/Post-aid sanctions/ 9/11  1998:06-2005:12  7.7  2 
Post 9/11  2001:09-2005:12  4.4  2 
 
5.1.  Impulse Response Functions (IRF’s) 
The main tool of unrestricted VAR system is the Impulse Response 
Function (IRF) generated by shock to innovation to each of the endogenous 
variables. Accordingly after estimation of the VAR system (for each data span) 
given by Equation (3.2) IRF’s have been generated by shock to innovation to the 
endogenous variables. The results are presented below.   9 
5.1.1.  Effect of Domestic Credit growth on Exchange Market Pressure 
The relevant IRF’s (Table 5.2) show a positive and contemporaneous 
affect of domestic credit growth (dct) on exchange market pressure (empt).  
 
Table 5.2 
Shock to: Innovation to Domestic Credit 
Impact upon: Exchange Market Pressure 
 Data  Spans 

















The positive and contemporaneous impact of shock to domestic credit 
growth upon exchange market pressure is as hypothesised and is in conformity 
with monetary approach―increase in domestic credit causes the exchange rate 
to depreciate or the foreign reserves to deplete or some combination of the two, 
that is, exchange market pressure. The monetary approach holds that given full 
employment, the newly created domestic credit is spent on import of goods and 
services or on acquisition of assets abroad. In Pakistan outward capital mobility 
being highly restricted, it is primarily the import of goods and services that 
causes the response.  
 
5.1.2.  Feedback Relation: Effect of Exchange Market Pressure  
           on Domestic Credit 
The relevant IRF’s (Table 5.3) for the full data span (91-05) and the sub 
span that cover the life of FCDs (91-98) depict a positive impact of the shock to 
exchange market pressure (empt) on domestic credit growth (dct). No 
statistically significant response is noticeable in the post FCD freeze/post-aid 
sanctions period and the post 9/11 span.  
 
Table 5.3 
Shock to: Innovation to Exchange Market Pressure 
Impact upon: Growth in Domestic Credit 
 Data  Spans 










Nil Nil   10
Though the response of domestic credit growth to a shock to exchange 
market pressure is positive in the first two spans, prudence, however demands 
just the opposite, that is, the authorities when faced with exchange market 
pressure (empt) should contract the growth rate of domestic credit so as to curb 
exchange market pressure (empt). This should be the response in the light of 
prediction of monetary theory and the positive impact of positive domestic 
credit growth upon exchange market pressure observed earlier (Table 5.2). 
Despite the response being, prima-facie, imprudent as far as controlling 
exchange market pressure is concerned the result is in conformity with what 
others have found for different economies. Tanner (2001, 2002) for Mexico and 
six East-Asian countries and Bautista and Bautista (2005) for Philippines also 
find a positive feedback from exchange market pressure (empt) to domestic 
credit growth (dct). Their findings confirm a key element of Mexican and the 
East-Asian currency crisis, that the authorities sterilised foreign reserves outflow 
and responded by providing additional liquidity to the banking system. This 
worsened the already high exchange market pressure [Bautista and Bautista 
(2002)]. The observed positive response of domestic credit (dct) to exchange 
market pressure shock (empt) suggests that authorities in Pakistan too, tend to 
sterilise foreign reserves outflow on the pattern noticed in economies referred 
above. Perhaps it is the fiscal needs/the urge boost growth that prompted such 
sterilisation. 
Another possible explanation offered by Tanner (2001) for East-Asian 
countries, that could be valid for Pakistan as well is that, banking sector, when 
faced with loan defaults tend to avoid the same, by offering more credit to the 
defaulters in the hope of rehabilitating the projects and thereby enabling them to 
repay the loans. This explanation seems partly true in case of Pakistan as well; 
as the 1990s has seen loan restructuring exercises being undertaken, by 
commercial banks to rehabilitate sick projects. This was done under the auspices 
of the government/SBP. Besides the non-recovery of loans by the banks could 
have led to liquidity crunch and the central bank in order facilitate fresh lending 
responded with an increase in domestic credit. 
To understand the absence of statistically significant response in post 
FCD freeze span (98-05) and post 9/11 span (01-05) note that after 9/11 the 
foreign reserves registered tremendous improvement and the exchange rate, for 
the first time in Pakistan’s history, was on an appreciation course. The increase 
in foreign reserves and exchange rate appreciation between September 2001 and 
December 2003 is given below in Table 5.4.  
Post 9/11 the surge in foreign reserves was due to (i) rescheduling/write-
off of foreign debt; (ii) remmitance of money by overseas Pakistanis through 
formal  channels  instead  of the  informal  channels  used earlier;
5 (iii) feeling of  
                                                 
5The change in channel was due to international crack-down on informal channels of 
remitting money.   11
Table 5.4 
Exchange Rate Appreciation and Increase in Foreign Reserves 
 
Sept. 2001  Dec. 2003 
Appreciation/ 
Increase 
Exchange Rate  Rs 64.20  Rs 57.21  12 Percent 
Foreign Reserves  $2,149  $10,941  409 Percent 
 
insecurity amongst Pakistanis residing in the West and (iv) and return of 
Pakistanis residing without proper documents in United States. 
Given the improvement in foreign reserves and appreciation of exchange 
rate the exchange market pressure remained consistently negative for 27 months 
(Oct. 01-Dec.03). Even during the following two years, the exchange market 
pressure remained negative for eight out of 24 months. Thus out of the total span 
of 52 months, the exchange market pressure had remained negative for 35 
months, this covers two-third of the post 9/11 span. Thus there is reason to 
believe that monetary policy in the post 9/11 span would be different from the 
one practiced earlier. Initially the impact was so sudden that in just two months 
following 9/11, the exchange rate had appreciated by over 5 percent and the 
foreign reserves had registered an increment of 47 percent. 
The appreciation of exchange rate was hurting the export competitiveness 
of the country. Besides, events following 9/11 had also adversely influenced 
exports, at least, in the short run. Given this the authorities purposely slowed 
down the appreciation of exchange rate to, (i) limit the damage to Pakistan’s 
export competitiveness (SBP 2001)
6 and (ii) to afford time to the exporters to 
adjust to the changed environment. Consequently the central bank purchased 
substantial foreign currency from the forex market against domestic currency, 
thereby increasing domestic credit. The year-wise intervention activity of the 
central bank is depicted below in Table 5.5.  
 
Table 5.5 
Purchase/Sale of Foreign Currency by SBP 
($ in Million) 
   Period  Interbank (net)  Kerb Purchases 
Net Addition 
to Foreign Reserves 
1999-2000 –797.0  1,633  836 
2000-2001 –1,126  2,157  1,031 
2001-2002  2,483 1,376 3,859 
2002-2003  4,546    429  4,975 
2003-2004    897  –  897 
Source:  SBP Annual Reports (Various Issues). 
Note:  The negative sign with the figures indicates sale of foreign currency. 
                                                 
6For detailed discussion regarding the favourable impact of 9/11 on Pakistan external 
account [see SBP annual report (2001, pp. 54–60)]. For monetary policy put into practice to factor in 
the new developments see pp. 79-80 of the same report.    12
Thus to maintain competitiveness of the country’s exports, domestic 
credit was increased consequent upon fall in exchange market pressure [SBP 
(2002-03), p.144 &163]. Given the foregoing explanation, the innovation to 
exchange market (decrease in this case) should have generated a negative 
response (increase in this case) from domestic credit during the sub-spans 
‘post FCD-freeze’ and ‘post 9/11’. The question then arises why a ‘nil’ 
rather than negative response is observed. The answer lies in sterilisation of 
the intervention activity referred above. For illustrative purpose the 




Sterilisation in 2001-02 
(Rs in Billions) 
   Impact  on  SBP 
   NFA  NDA 
1  Interbank US $ Purchases (Net)     150   
2 Kerb  Purchases  84   
3  Government Borrowing from Commercial Banks 
(Rs 160.4 Billion) 
  
4  Retirement of Government Securities with SBP    –287 
5    Net Impact  234  –287 
6  Net Impact on Reserve Money (Domestic Credit)    –53 
NFA: Net Foreign Assets. 
NDA: Net Domestic Assets. 
 
The domestic credit growth of Rs 234 billion affected due to purchase of 
foreign currency, during 2001-02, by the State bank was more than offset by 
retirement of government borrowing from SBP (Table 5.6―Serial No. 6). Thus 
the intervention activity, in 2001-02, was completely sterilised. Similarly out of 
the foreign currency purchased worth Rs 291 billion in 2002-03, Rs 206 million 
was sterilised (SBP 02-03, p.79). It is because of this kind of sterilisation that 
despite the huge foreign currency purchases against domestic currency, no 
significant response is observed, during the post 9/11 span, from exchange 
market pressure to domestic credit. 
 
5.1.3.  Shock to Interest Rate: Impact upon Exchange Market Pressure  
The statistically significant responses of exchange market pressure (empt) 
to interest rate shock are reported below (Table 5.7).   13
Table 5.7 
Shock to: Innovation to Interest Rate 
Impact upon: Exchange Market Pressure 
Data Spans 












   0.97 
(2.89) 






Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. 
 
The impact of shock to interest rate on exchange market pressure is, as 
hypothesised, positive in all the data spans. No statistically significant response 
is observed in the span 98-05. First, we take up the positive response observed in 
the two sub spans, that is the FCD span and the post 9/11 span and then we 
move on to the positive response observed in full span and the absence of 
response in the span 98-05—
 the post FCD-freeze span. 
The positive influence of interest rate upon exchange market pressure 
during the FCD span (1991:04-1998:05) can be explained in terms of the theory 
of money demand and the change in attractiveness of domestic securities vis-à-
vis international securities. The following flow chart explains the channel 
through which FCDs might have influenced exchange market pressure 
consequent upon shock to interest rate. 
Increase in interest rate → decrease in money demand→ exchange rate 
depreciation → increase in yield on FCDs → increase in FCDs volume 
→ change in exchange market pressure. 
A possible explanation for the impact of interest rate shock on 
exchange market pressure, as given in the foregoing flow chart, is that the 
increase in interest rate reduced money demand that in turn caused the 
exchange rate to depreciate. It is noteworthy that the total yield on foreign 
currency deposits (FCDs) comprised the interest earned on FCDs plus the 
exchange rate depreciation. Higher the exchange rate depreciation, greater 
the yield on FCDs. As the exchange rate depreciation caused the yield on 
FCDs to increase, therefore the depreciation contributed to increase in 
volume of FCDs with commercial banks. The surrender of the foreign 
currency thus mobilised by banks to SBP, increased foreign reserves thereby 
contributing to decline in exchange market pressure, however on the other 
hand exchange rate depreciation, contributed to the increase in exchange 
market pressure.    14
Given the positive as well as negative impact of FCDs on exchange 
market pressure the authorities had a dilemma at hand. The fact that, by and 
large, the interest rate, during the FCD span, maintained an upward course and 
the ultimate response of exchange market pressure to interest rate shock is 
positive (i.e. increase)  suggests that alleviation impact due to increase in foreign 
reserves was more than offset by the exchange rate depreciation. (During the 
span the interest rate recorded an increment of 744 basis points while the 
exchange rate depreciated by 87 percent―Table 5.8). The view is corroborated 
by the SBP annual report 1997-98 that warns the government of the negative 
implications of FCDs.
7   
 
Table 5.8 







Interest Rate  8.80 %  16.24 %  744 basis points 
Exchange Rate  23.50  44.05  87 percent 
 
This brings us to the question that why the government persisted with the 
scheme if the net impact of the scheme on exchange market pressure was 
negative.  The ensuing analysis provides the answer. Import coverage ratio, that 
measures the country’s ability to meet its imports from forex reserves alone, is 
one measure used to determine the safe/optimal level of foreign reserves. Import 
coverage ratio that prevailed during the FCD span is shown below (Table 5.9). 
                                               
Table 5.9 
Foreign Reserves as Percentage of Imports 
Year 
Imports 
($ in Billions) 
Reserves 
(12-Month avg.) 
($ in Billions) 
Import coverage 
(Avg. Resv*. as 
% of Imports) 
90-91 8,325  366  4.27 
91-92 8,998  534  5.39 
92-93 10,049  808  8.04 
93-94 8,685  1,186  13.66 
94-95 10,296  2,642  25.66 
95-96 12,015  1,626  13.53 
96-97 11,241  1,040  9.25 
97-98 10,301  1,268  12.31 
*Avg. of reserves at the beginning and end of the year. 
                                                 
7SBP annual report 1997-98, pp. 109-23.   15
Assuming that foreign reserves volume of less than 12 weeks of imports (i.e. 25 
percent of annual imports) reflects a crisis-like situation then it is evident from             
Table 5.9 that during the entire FCD-span, the reserves held were precariously low in 
relation to imports and only once did these barely crossed the danger mark of 25 
percent of imports. Another indicator of foreign reserves adequacy is the Guidotti rule, 
which says that reserves should be enough to meet scheduled external debt payments 
as well as the projected current account deficit (excluding interest payments) for the 
next 12 months. On this criterion, as well, Pakistan did not have enough reserves at the 
beginning of any fiscal year till 2002-03 [SBP (2002-03), p. 162]. 
It was this low level of foreign reserves that forced the government to 
continue with the FCD scheme and embrace the vicious cycle of interest rate hike-
exchange rate depreciation. Hence the positive response of interest rate to shock to 
exchange market pressure during the FCD span.  It appears that it is the FCDs 
channel, described above that has been operative during the span. The view gains 
substance from the opinion that post FCD-freeze span (98:06-05:12) does not exhibit 
any impact of interest rate shock on exchange market pressure (Table 5.7).  
Regarding the positive impact of interest rate on exchange market 
pressure during the post 9/11 span, an entirely different explanation is in order 
than the one given for the FCD span.  
Post 9/11, the movement of interest rate and exchange market pressure can be 
studied in two distinct parts. One; the period from 2001:09 to 2003:12 when the 
exchange rate was appreciating (8 percent appreciation), foreign reserves were on 
the rise and interest rate declined by 929 basis points. Second; the period from 
2004:01 to 2005:12 when the exchange rate was depreciating (5 percent 
depreciation) and interest rate was on the rise: (704 basis points increase).
8 The 
positive relationship observed between the movements in exchange rate and interest 
rate during the two periods is depicted in Fig. 5.1 and Fig. 5.2 
 

































                                                 
8For econometric analysis the post 9/11span has not been broken further into two sub-spans 
because that would have reduced the sample size to 28 months and 24 months respectively—a 
sample size not large enough for reliable econometric investigation. 
Fig. 5.1.  Exchange Rate and Interest Rate Movement 
(2001:10 to 2003:11)  16
It is evident from Fig. 5.1 that since 9/11 till December 2003 the interest 
rate was declining and the exchange rate was on an appreciation course, thus 
representing the positive relationship between the two. From January 2004 the 
interest rate set on an upward course and the exchange rate also broke its 
appreciation spell to set on a depreciation course once again. (Fig 5.2) The 
positive relationship shown in two figures is in conformity with the theory and is 
as hypothesised. 
 


































5.1.4. Feedback Relation: Effect of Exchange Market Pressure  
         on Interest Rate  
The statistically significant responses of interest rate (it) to shock 
exchange market pressure (empt) are noted below (Table 5.10).  
 
Table 5.10 
Shock to: Innovation to Exchange Market Pressure  
Impact Upon: Interest Rate 
 Data  Spans 




























    
Note:  t-statistics in parenthesis. 
         *Significant at 10 percent level. 
Fig. 5.2.  Exchange Rate and Interest Rate Movement 
(2003:12 to 2005:12)  17
The positive feedback from exchange market pressure to interest rate is 
observed in all the data spans (Table 5.10). First we examine the response 
during the FCD span and then take up the responses in post-freeze and post 9/11 
span.  
Explanation for the positive feedback from exchange market pressure to 
interest rate is found in what the literature labels ‘interest rate defense of 
exchange rate’ [Flood and Jeanne (2000), Tanner (2002)]. Under this strategy 
the authorities when faced with exchange market pressure, respond with 
influencing a hike in domestic interest rate. Given international rate, the increase 
in domestic interest rate encourages capital inflows and vice versa, provided 
capital mobility conditions are fulfilled. 
1990s was not a good decade for external account scenario of Pakistan. 
Inflows from a major source, viz. remittances from overseas Pakistanis, had been 
on a declining course since 1983 (1981-82: $2.9 billion, 1999-00: $0.98 billion). 
Besides, international geo-political environment being not too favourable, 
foreign lending, bilateral as well as multilateral, was scanty and even that was 
available only on harsh terms. Given this scenario, the authorities, in March 
1991, allowed the residents to hold Foreign Currency Deposits (FCDs) with 
commercial banks. The deposit accounts were freezed in May 1998.
9  During 
this period, as the exchange market pressure was relatively high the authorities 
might have purposely influenced an upward movement in interest rate to attract 
deposits in foreign currency accounts. Regarding the high emp its noteworthy 
that during the span exchange rate depreciated by 87 percent (Table 5.7) and 
except for FY 94-95 foreign reserves covered imports merely to extent the 
extent of 14 percent or even lesser ( Table 5.10). 
Another possible explanation for the hike in interest rate, during major 
part of ’90s in response to shock to exchange market pressure can be found 
in the dollarisation phenomena. As economic agents purchased foreign 
currency from the kerb market for holding FCDs, the additional demand for 
foreign currency in the kerb market caused the Rupee to depreciate and 
improved the FCDs’ yield (interest on deposits plus exchange rate 
depreciation) but the depreciation also contributed to inflation and to control 
inflation the authorities had to respond with the increment in interest rate. 
Whatever the mechanics, an important piece in the cycle leading to interest 
rate hike is the exchange rate depreciation which is a component of 
exchange market pressure. Hence the positive feedback from interest rate to 
exchange market pressure. 
                                                 
9The freeze on FCDs meant that, against the terms of the contract, account holders were 
allowed to withdraw only the Rupee equivalent  again the money in foreign currency that they had 
deposited. This had shattered the confidence of the depositors and inflows into the account almost 
stopped thereby reducing the demand for foreign currency in the kerb market and contributing to de-
dollarisation.   18
Given the polar objectives of encouraging FCDs (as these contributed to 
increment in foreign reserves) through dollarisation and controlling inflation the 
authorities had a dilemma at hand. Given the dilemma the authorities went for 
the vicious circle of exchange market pressure-interest rate hike. The vicious 
circle went on during the seven years life of FCDs, however its impact seems so 
pronounced that the positive impact of empt on it is observed even when the full 
span of 14.9 years is considered. (The magnitude of exchange rate depreciation 
and interest rate hike during the FCD span is shown in Table 5.8). 
The positive impact of (empt) on (it) for the span 1998-05 and 2001-05 is 
accounted for in the following manner: The positive feedback from exchange 
market pressure to interest rate during the post-FCD freeze span can be studied 
in two distinct parts, that is the pre 9/11 and post 9/11 period. The first shock, 
during the span, came as the multilateral/bilateral lending agencies imposed aid 
sanctions upon Pakistan as the country went Nuclear in May 1998. The second 
shock occurred with 9/11. Four measures undertaken in the wake of aid-
sanctions led to decrease in exchange market pressure. These include: (i) freeze 
on foreign currency accounts; (ii) introduction of two tier exchange rate in July 
1998 and pure float in May 1999; (iii) rationing of imports; and (iv) Saudi Oil 
facility. Impact of the measure on exchange market pressure is discussed below.  
We have argued earlier in this section that FCDs had led to dollarisation 
and in section 5.1.3 that the net impact of FCDs seemingly caused a persistent 
increment in exchange market pressure. With the freeze on these deposits 
dollarisation and hence the exchange rate depreciation on this count came to a 
halt and therefore the pressure declined. 
The two-tier exchange rate, introduced on July 22, 1998, required 
conducting the transactions involving foreign exchange at a composite rate, 
which was based on a certain specified ratio (initially 50:50) of the official rate 
(announced by SBP) and floating interbank rate (determined on the basis of 
demand and supply of foreign currency in interbank market). Except for certain 
specified goods that were allowed to be imported at official rate, rest of the trade 
was done only at the composite rate. Following the aid-sanctions/FCD-freeze, 
for following 10 months (June 98-April 99) the exchange rate was held static at 
Rs 46 to dollar one. The Rupee was devalued by 12.3 percent in May 1999 to 
attain a value of Rs 51.69 and was then held static again around this level for yet 
another 16 months, that is, till August 2000. The interbank rate on the other 
hand continued to depreciate in line with market conditions.  
Thus though the official rate was held static for sufficient length of time, 
the introduction of composite rate, that depended on interbank rate as well, had in 
fact meant the defecto devaluation of Rupee. It was this defecto devaluation, which 
was fairly large, that had discouraged imports and therefore led to reduction in 
trade deficit. Besides, some rationing of imports in the initial period, after the 
emergence of crisis, had also contributed to reduction in trade deficit. The   19
reduction, in turn, helped to contain exchange market pressure. Finally, Saudi oil 
facility, negotiated after the aid-sanctions, allowed the country to import a major 
chunk of its oil needs for credit. This by reducing the outflow of foreign currency 
also served to contain exchange market pressure. It was the combined effect of the 
four measures discussed above that exchange market pressure on average, 
declined, despite the aid sanctions and the freeze on FCDs in two years (i.e. 98-99 
and 99-00) following aid sanctions/FCD freeze (Table 5.11).  
                                   
Table 5.11 
Trade Deficit and Exchange Market Pressure 
($ in Millions)           
 Year 
  1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 
Trade  Deficit –1,867 –2,085 –1,412 –1,269  –294  –536 
Exports  8,434 7,528 8,190 8,933 9,140  10,889 
Imports  –10,301 –9,613  –9,602 –10,202 –9,434 –11,425 
empt (Avg.)
*  1.34 0.07 0.34  1.7  -3.6 -4.2 
*Average of emp at the beginning and end of the year. 
 
While analysing the feedback from exchange market pressure to interest rate, 
we had indicated that the relatively high exchange market pressure in the FCD span 
had forced the authorities to adopt interest rate defense of exchange rate. Now that 
the pressure declined the need for such defense was no longer there and hence the 
decline in interest rate consequent upon decrease in exchange market pressure. 
Regarding the positive feedback from interest rate to exchange market 
pressure during the second part of the span, that is post 9/11 span, again we had 
discussed earlier (in Section 5.1.2) that post 9/11 for 35 months out 53 months 
span the exchange market pressure remained not only low but even negative. 
Given the low pressure, the need for defending the Rupee was not there and this 
allowed the SBP to reduce the interest rate that otherwise was also required to 
give a boost to economic activity. The following statements emanating from 
SBP confirm the point. 
Improvement in the external sector also had a major impact on SBP 
policies—the absence of pressures on the exchange rate allowed SBP to reduce 
the Bank discount rate. [SBP Annual Report (2001-02), p. 156]. 
The continued forex inflows—during FY03 allowed, the SBP to reduce 
the discount rate to an all-time low at 7.5 percent in November 2002. (SBP 
Annual report 2002-03, p.147). 
The foregoing discussion explains how the low exchange market pressure 
during the post-FCD freeze span and the post 9/11 span contributed to the 
decline in interest rate. This accounts for the positive impact, during the two 
spans, of shock to exchange market pressure upon interest rate.    20
5.2.  Sensitivity Analysis 
As indicated earlier under theoretical framework, VAR results are 
sensitive to ordering of variables of the system. To guard against the possibility 
of ordering-based result, the results have been checked against sensitivity to 
ordering. The main ordering used in this study is [dc-i-y-emp]. Significant IRF’s 
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Note:  t-statistics in parenthesis. 
 
It is apparent from the Table 5.12 that the results are, by and large, robust. 
The ordering that has empt in the first place (and thus prior to dct) alters the 
coefficients significantly however the change in Ordering only effects the size 
of the coefficients, the direction of response, remains unaffected.  
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
Exchange market pressure represents disequilibrium in money market. 
This study, in the spirit of Girton and Roper (1977) takes the view that as 
managed float involves changes in exchange rate as well in foreign reserves 
therefore to study disequilibrium in money market/characterise the external 
account, under the regime, we need to focus upon a composite variable that 
incorporates changes in foreign reserves as well as variation in exchange rate. 
Following Girton and Roper we refer to the composite variable thus developed 
as exchange market pressure.   21
We developed a time series of exchange market pressure in accordance 
with the definition of Girton and Roper to examine interaction of the monetary 
variables  viz. domestic credit and interest rate with the exchange market 
pressure. Innovation to domestic credit as well as to interest rate generates a 
positive response from exchange market pressure. Both the results are in 
conformity with the theory. The impact of domestic credit is much stronger (i.e. 
the size of the coefficients is relatively larger), as compared to interest rate, 
besides the impact of domestic credit is observed in all the data spans examined 
while the impact of interest rate on exchange market pressure is not observable 
in the post-FCD freeze span (1998:06—2005:12). The two findings together 
imply that domestic credit has been the dominant tool of monetary policy vis-à-
vis managing exchange market pressure. Our results also show that post 9/11, 
given the unexpected and sharp decline in exchange market pressure, domestic 
credit was actively used to manage the pressure so as avoid larger adverse 
impact upon export competitiveness. The intervention was largely sterilised to 
protect the economy from inflationary impact of increase in money supply.  
Feedback from exchange market pressure to domestic credit is positive in 
all the data spans examined. The response, though against conventional wisdom, 
is in conformity with findings of forerunners. The apparent reason for the 
imprudent response lies in monetary policy being influenced by; (i) fiscal needs, 
(ii) the eagerness boost growth (iii) the need to make-up for the liquidity crunch 
created due default on bank loans, and (iv) the need to create additional liquidity 
to revive the sick industries.  
FCDs had provided some inward capital mobility (1991-98), the 
observance of response from interest rate to exchange market pressure, though a 
weaker one, in the pre-freeze period and absence of the same in post-freeze 
period serves to emphasise that for the interest rate to work as a tool of monetary 
policy  vis-à-vis exchange market pressure a reasonable degree of capital 
mobility is called for.  
Feedback relation from exchange market pressure to interest rate is also 
positive and is observed in all the data spans examined. For the FCD span, the 
response implies an interest rate defense of the exchange rate. The purpose 
being to control inflation, stemming from exchange rate depreciation, that itself 
was due to dollarisation. Post FCD-freeze/post 9/11 dollarisation came to a halt 
for (i) want of avenue (FCDs that served as avenue were freezed) and (ii) due to 
dramatic improvement in external account, therefore the need to defend the 
Rupee vanished, hence the positive feedback, during the spans, from interest rate 
to exchange market pressure—decrease in interest rate in response to decrease in 
exchange market pressure. 




Reserve Money being composed of domestic and foreign components, the 
domestic credit is worked out as the difference between total Reserve Money 
and the foreign component of Reserve Money. The foreign component is 
obtained by multiplying the month-end foreign reserves outstanding with the 
relevant month-end nominal exchange rate. To work out the Domestic Credit in 
the manner referred above, we need data on the following series. 
• Reserve Money 
• Foreign Reserves 
• Nominal Exchange rate 
 
Exchange Market Pressure 
Exchange market pressure (emp), defined as sum of exchange rate 
depreciation and foreign reserves outflow scaled by monetary base (Reserve 
money) requires data on the following:                                  
• Nominal exchange rate 
• Foreign Reserves 
• Reserve Money 
The data required for generating the Exchange market pressure series is 
exactly the same as required for generating domestic credit series. 
 
Deviation from Purchasing Power Parity  
As explained earlier under theoretical framework deviation from 
purchasing power parity (PPP) is to be worked out as per Equation (A-1) which 
after slight algebraic manipulation is reproduced below for ready reference.  
t t t t e z π − π + =
*   … … … … … …  (A-1)     
To generate the series ‘Deviation from PPP’ (zt) we need data on the 
following: 
• Nominal exchange rate   
• International price level (Proxy: US CPI) 
Domestic price level (CPI) 
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